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CHIEF JUSTICE JOSEPH WEINTRAUB:
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
1957-1973
Dominick A. Mazzagettit
Joseph Weintraub was appointed Chief Justice of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in August 1957. Before his appointment he
had served as a trial judge for nine months and as an Associate
Justice for ten months. He served as Chief Justice for sixteen years,
and in that time he molded the New Jersey Supreme Court into
one of the most effective and influential high courts in the nation.
He demonstrated a flair for administration, an innovative judicial
approach, and an unsurpassed intellectual depth. Joseph Wein-
traub influenced judicial thought throughout the country; he
dominated the law in New Jersey.
The New Jersey Supreme Court from 1957 to 1973 provided
an excellent forum for the utilization of Joseph Weintraub's talents.
The Associate Justices combined judicial experience with acknowl-
edged intellectual ability. The membership of the court remained
intact for more than ten of the sixteen years.' Of all the honors
bestowed upon Joseph Weintraub, his greatest must be the entirety
of the work and achievements of the New Jersey Supreme Court
during his tenure. The "Weintraub Court," as it became known,
applied common sense and practical solutions to complex legal
problems. It did not fear innovation. If its approach required novel
legal analysis or criticism of accepted practices, the court would
hesitate only to explain its departure from conventional analysis or
practices. The Weintraub Court was a court of action-in proce-
dure, in administration, and in substantive law.
Rules, administrative directives, and decisions emanating from
the New Jersey Supreme Court in the last sixteen years have
touched every aspect of law and legal practice. To catalogue the
achievements of the court would prove an enormous task. This
t Member of the New Jersey Bar. Clerk to Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub, New Jersey
Supreme Court, 1972-73. A.B. 1967, Rutgers University; J.D. 1972, Cornell University.
I The following six justices served with Chief Justice Weintraub from October 1960 to
March 1971: Nathan L. Jacobs, John J. Francis, Haydn Proctor, Frederick W. Hall, C.
Thomas Schettino, and Vincent S. Haneman.
Justices Hall and Schettino had replaced Harry Heher and William A. Wachenfeld, who
both retired in early 1959. Justice Haneman replaced Albert E. Burling, who died in
October 1960. Justice Haneman retired in March 1971, and was replaced by Justice Worrall
F. Mountain.
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Article seeks to detail the court's contributions in only selected
areas, and thereby to demonstrate the style and approach which
made the New Jersey Supreme Court an example of leadership for
other courts throughout the nation. The areas selected-criminal
justice, school financing, and reapportionment-reveal the
significance of the court's contributions. Each area has undergone
dramatic reanalysis in the past sixteen years, and in each Chief
Justice Weintraub and the New Jersey Supreme Court have distin-
guished themselves.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Chief Justice Weintraub took particular interest in the criminal
matters before his court and, in a field dominated by startling
federal decisions, the New Jersey Court made significant contribu-
tions to criminal law, administration, and procedure. The list of
significant decisions handed down during Chief Justice
Weintraub's tenure cannot be digested in this survey. But the
concerns of the Chief Justice and his approaches to criminal law
can be illustrated through an analysis of his views on such impor-
tant issues as criminal insanity and pretrial discovery.
A. The Insanity Defense
My thesis is that insanity should have nothing to do with the
adjudication of guilt but rather should bear upon the disposition
of the offender after conviction, and that the contest among
M'Naghten and its competitive concepts .. .is simply a struggle
over an irrelevancy.'
Chief Justice Weintraub expressed these views at a judicial
conference in 1964 and adhered to them in the criminal insanity
cases before the New Jersey Supreme Court. In Chief Justice
Weintraub's view the overriding consideration in such cases was the
protection of society from the sick as well as the bad; the bad to be
detained in prisons with the attendant disadvantages and stigma of
incarceration and the sick to be detained and cared for in state
hospitals until "restored to reason. '3
Insanity does not constitute a defense in a criminal proceed-
ing, but rather negates one of the basic elements of the state's
2 Insanity as a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365, 369 (1964) (panel discussion) (remarks of Joseph
Weintraub, Chief Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court).
I N.J. Rav. STAT. § 2A:163-3 (1951).
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case-the mental capacity or mens rea of the defendant.4 Even if the
state can prove beyond a doubt that the defendant committed the
alleged act-the actus reus-the law will not punish him under the
M'Naghten Rule if he was "laboring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was
doing was wrong."5 The Chief Justice thought that the M'Naghten
Rule, although imperfect, was the most precise test available be-
cause it speaks to the effect on the state of mind from a mental
disease, not to doctors' varying concepts of mental disease. Fur-
thermore,
all the doctrines which would excuse an offender from criminal
accountability because of insanity have the common characteristic
of attempting to distinguish between the sick and the bad. And
the distinction is made even though no scientific evidence sepa-
rates the sick from the bad in terms of personal blameworthiness.
Indeed, to a psychiatrist the sick and the bad are equally unfor-
tunate. Blame is something he leaves to the moral judgment of
philosophers, and they draw upon their unverifiable view of man
and his endowments. 6
Adherence to the M'Naghten Rule was reaffirmed by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Lucas, 7 against arguments for
adoption of the Durham Rule.8 Proponents of the Durham Rule,
which would acquit a defendant merely u'pon proof that his act was
the product of a mental disease or defect, could not convince the
court that psychiatric advances would sustain such a rule and still
protect society from "grievous anti-social acts."9 The concepts of
mental disease and mental defects remained too vague.' 0 In a
concurring opinion, Chief Justice Weintraub urged that psychiatric
advances be utilized in post-conviction disposition of the offender
where they could best serve society and the individual. 1'
Chief Justice Weintraub's ideas on criminal insanity were best
expressed in State v. Maik,' 2 in which the defense of "temporary
37 F.R.D. at 369-70.
5 Aponte v. State, 30 N.J. 441, 450, 153 A.2d 665, 669 (1959).
6 State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 213, 287 A.2d 715, 720 (1972).
7 30 N.J. 37, 152 A.2d 50 (1959).
8 See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
30 N.J. at 71-72, 152 A.2d at 68.
10 Id. at 72, 152 A.2d at 68. In State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965), the
court rejected the concept of "psychodynamics" which seeks to explain each man's actions as
the unconscious result of his emotional make-up.
"1 30 N.J. at 84-85, 152 A.2d at 75-76.
12 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d 715 (1972), modifying 114 N.J. Super. 470, 277 A.2d 235 (App.
Div. 1971).
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insanity" was argued. A Trenton State College student confessed to
the murder of his friend and fellow student. The student ex-
plained to psychiatrists that he had committed the brutal stabbing
because of a belief that the victim wanted to die. Psychiatrists
agreed at the trial that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia
which had remained dormant until severe stress or use of drugs
brought about an acute psychotic eruption.
Responding to the trial judge's charge that "if the psychosis
was triggered by the voluntary use of LSD or hashish, the defense
of insanity could not stand,"'1 3 the jury returned a verdict of
murder in the second degree. The appellate division reversed the
conviction on the ground that the trial judge should have directed
an acquittal by reason of insanity. 4
On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Weintraub agreed with the trial court's reasoning that voluntary
use of drugs or liquor does not excuse criminal responsibility. He
emphasized the need to protect society:
The required element of badness can be found in the intentional
use of the stimulant or depressant. Moreover, to say that one
who offended while under such influence was sick would suggest
that his sickness disappeared when he sobered up and hence he
should be released. Such a concept would hardly protect others
from the prospect of repeated injury.15
But the Chief Justice saw Maik as an exception to this rule. The use
of drugs did not cause Maik's underlying schizophrenia, but rather
it triggered the eruption of the psychotic condition which lasted
after the drugs had worn off. The Chief Justice considered the
exception to be "compatible with the philosophical basis of
M'Naghten,"'6 but thought that the more crucial question was
whether, once acquitted on grounds of insanity, the defendant
could be dealt with in a manner consistent with the protection of
society.
The New Jersey statutes require that a person acquitted of a
criminal charge by reason of insanity be confined to a state hospital
until "restored to reason. 1 7 Chief Justice Weintraub saw the in-
terests of society best protected, in Maik's case, by confinement
' 60 N.J. at 212, 287 A.2d at 719 (paraphrasing trial court instructions); see 114 N.j.
Super. at 475, 277 A.2d at 238.
14 114 N.J. Super. 470, 277 A.2d 235 (App. Div. 1971).
15 60 N.J. at 214, 287 A.2d at 721.
16 Id. at 216, 287 A.2d at 722.
17 N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:163-3 (1951).
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until the underlying schizophrenia no longer posed a threat of
erupting:
Hence, while a psychotic episode, though temporary in the
sense that a defendant may be relieved of its grip and thereupon
be in "remission," will be accepted as a state of insanity which
may excuse under M'Naghten, insanity continues notwithstanding
remission so long as the underlying latent condition remains, and
the defendant will not be "restored to reason" within the mean-
ing of the statute unless that condition is removed or effectively
neutralized if it can be."8
The Chief Justice suggested the possibility of conditional release of
such persons, subject to medical assurances, if the court deemed it
feasible.
B. Pretrial Discovery
In the field of criminal procedure the New Jersey Supreme
Court has focused on concepts of "fairness," striving to give an
accused effective means of proving his innocence. Rigid doctrines
of constitutional magnitude have been avoided and the court has
made extensive use of its rile-making powers where the piecemeal,
case-by-case approach has proved ineffective. The court's efforts in
improving pretrial discovery exemplify these attitudes. Its rulings
had been granting broader discovery to criminal defendants, ab-
sent the prosecutor's showing of societal harm, but by 1966 the
court realized the need for an overall study of the problem and a
comprehensive set of rules for clarity and fairness was conse-
quently formulated.' 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court's movement in the area of
pretrial discovery gained significance in the 1958 decision of State
v. Johnson.20 The court allowed a defendant's motion for discovery
of all his pretrial statements and confessions. The defendant al-
leged that he could not adequately recall them and needed the
statements to prepare for trial. Chief Justice Weintraub spoke for
the court:
We start with the premise that truth is best revealed by a
" 60 N.J. at 218-19, 287 A.2d at 723.
"9 See, e.g., N.J. Sup. CT. R. 3:13-3(a), (b). A review of the Commentary accompanying
each section of the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Discovery and
Procedure Before Trial (Tent. Draft, May 1969), will indicate the many areas of pretrial
discovery in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has received recognition through these
rules. See, e.g., id. § 2.1, at 58-59, 65, 67, 69; id. § 2.6, at 91.
20 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 145, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
933 (1961).
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decent opportunity to prepare in advance of trial. We have
embraced that tenet with respect to civil litigation, and absent
overriding considerations, it should be as valid in criminal mat-
ters. It is of no moment that pretrial inspection is not constitu-
tionally assured.... We are not limited to constitutional minima;
rather we strive for practices which will best promote the quest
for truth ...
It is difficult to understand why a defendant should be
denied pretrial inspection of his own statement in the absence of
circumstances affirmatively indicating disservice to the public
interest.2
1
In the 1966 decision of State v. Tate,22 the defendant, under
indictment for murder, sought to depose the state's witnesses.
Chief Justice Weintraub found no constitutional right in such a
request and wa forced to reject it on practical grounds. The
burdens already on the processes of criminal justice precluded
adoption of such a time-consuming procedure. The advantage of
pretrial settlements, which in many cases result from civil deposi-
tions, would not be present in the criminal milieu. The defendant
would have to be satisfied with a list of the state's witnesses, bills of
particulars, and, for use in cross-examination, the statements of
witnesses to the police and grand jury. In the course of his opinion,
the Chief Justice did make suggestions for possible reform of the
criminal justice system:
Perhaps the investigatorial arms of government should be
deemed the impartial servants of the defense as well as the
prosecution, with the work product available to both, subject only
to such restrictions as the personal security of a witness may
demand. In a sense that proposition would be but an extension
of the settled view that the prosecution must seek only a just
result, and that the duty is the State's to produce or offer to the
defendant whatever it has that could help him. To open the
State's file before trial would have the virtue of relieving the
prosecutor of the burden of deciding correctly what should be
revealed in obedience to his ethical obligation. Further, the
defense may see significance in facts which to the prosecutor are
but neutral.2
3
21 Id. at 136-37, 145 A.2d at 315.
22 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12 (1966).
23 Id. at 355-56, 221 A.2d at 14. In this context one should note the cases of State v.
Miller, 41 N.J. 65, 194 A.2d 728 (1963), and State v. Williams, 46 N.J. 427, 217 A.2d 609
(1966), wherein the court allowed a private investigator (Miller) and an expert witness
(Wiliams) to be retained at county expense to aid the defense of an indigent. These cases
present another indication of the court's search for "fairness" and an effective means of
defense in the area of criminal justice.
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The first significant step in such a reform was the call in the
Tate opinion for a special judicial seminar which led to the adop-
tion of the 1966 rules for the New Jersey courts. Rule 3:13, which
was extensively revised in 1967, grants discovery as of right to the
defendant with reference to
(1) designated books, tangible objects, papers or docu-
ments obtained from or belonging to him;
(2) records of statements or confessions, signed or un-
signed, by the defendant or copies thereof;
(3) defendant's grand jury testimony;
(4) results or reports of physical or mental examinations
and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the
matter or copies thereof, which are known by the prosecuting
attorney to be within his possession, custody or control;
(5) reports or records of prior convictions of the defen-
dant.
In addition, the Rule provides that the defendant can seek
discovery at the court's discretion, and subject only to the state's
"showing of good cause" to the contrary, of: (1) all relevant "books,
papers, documents or tangible objects, buildings or places . . .
which are within the custody or control of the State"; (2) the
"names, and addresses of any persons the prosecuting attorney
knows to have relevant evidence or information"; (3) "any relevant
records of statements, signed or unsigned, by such persons or by
codefendants which are within the possession, custody or control of
the prosecuting attorney and any relevant record of prior convic-
tions of such persons if known to the prosecuting attorney"; (4)
"any relevant grand jury testimony of such persons or codefen-
dants."
These state court rules go further than Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, upon which they were modeled,
because the federal rule places all of the defendant's discovery at
the discretion of the court. They stand as concrete evidence of the
Weintraub Court's firm belief that the case-by-case approach of the
federal courts is an inferior means by which to insure an effective
and efficient criminal justice system.
C. Weintraub as Critic
Chief Justice Weintraub received considerable notoriety as a
critic of the decisions, policies, and methods of the United States
Supreme Court in the area of criminal justice. Some of the advan-
tages afforded the accused by the Warren Court's constitutional
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pronouncements could not be justified, he felt, in light of every
individual's right to protection of his person and property. The
setting of these rights in constitutional terms, furthermore, fore-
stalled efforts by the state courts, which have the primary responsi-
bility in criminal prosecutions, to find more effective means to
assure fairness to the accused while also protecting the rights of
society. Chief Justice Weintraub also found offensive the United
States Supreme Court's case-by-case approach to the serious prob-
lems of criminal procedure which provided patchwork guid-
ance to the state courts and engendered a flood of post-conviction
applications.
Perhaps the strongest criticism levelled at the United States
Supreme Court came in response to its adoption of the exclusion-
ary rule for all state as well as federal courts. Prior to Mapp v.
Ohio, 24 the New Jersey Supreme Court had rejected the rule which
required suppression of evidence of guilt obtained by illegal
searches and seizures. 5 Chief Justice Weintraub opposed the rule
because the results it produced-helping the guilty escape
conviction-could not be justified by its purpose-punishing law
enforcement officials for fourth amendment violations:
All the competing rights involved belong to the individual.
The State has none-it has only duties, and powers with which to
discharge them. To set criminals free is to exact a price, not from
some pain-free societal entity, but from innocent individuals who
will be their next victims. There are other hurts as well, for the
suppression of proof of guilt must weaken respect for the reach
of the law, thereby increasing the toll of victims and injuring as
well those offenders who might have been deterred from a
career of lawlessness. Some would add their belief that current
doctrines tend to corrupt officials who, struggling to cope with
the dirty realities of crime, strain to bring the facts within
unrealistic concepts. These trespasses upon the first right of the
individual to be protected from attack should not be suffered
unless it is plain that some larger individual value is served.2 6
In the recent case of State v. Bisaccia,27 the Chief Justice
questioned the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule after ten years
of application. The law remained unclear as to whether, as under
the Bisaccia facts, an honest mistake in the address provided in a
search warrant required suppression of the evidence thereby
24 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25 Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958).
26 State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 264, 250 A.2d 130, 131 (1969), application of bail denied,
400 U.S. 859 (1970).
27 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971).
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seized. The Chief Justice opted against rigid application of the
rule. In light of its unfortunate side effects, the exclusionary rule
should be applied only where its purpose of correction of malfeas-
ance by law enforcement officials can be achieved. And this was not
the case in Bisaccia.2 s
Chief Justice Weintraub recognized that
[o]thers may take a different view of what is just, and of
course we would not deny them their right to do so. The
question is whether the Constitution of the United States dictates
a single answer. It seems evident to us that it leaves judges free to
disagree. This is as it should be. The Constitution must not be
busied with issues that are minutiae in a grand scheme of things;
it serves best as a majestic presence, unperturbed by claims of
absolute verity in matters economic, social, moral, spiritual, med-
ical or penological. It is very human, and very wrong, to see one's
image in every nook of the Constitution. There must be toler-
ance of disagreement, for without it there can be no experimen-
tation or ready accommodation to a changing scene. Of greater
importance, the judiciary must not lose popular acceptance as the
final arbiter of the Constitution in historic disputes. This unique
mystic value could be lost if the Constitution, construed to be
weighted down with matters of legislative calibre, could com-
mand no higher regard.
29
The federal concept of "waiver" of constitutional rights and
the expansion of post-conviction relief in the federal courts also
came under criticism by Chief Justice Weintraub. He viewed the
doctrine of waiver as more conclusional than instructive, 30 and the
New Jersey Court's strong views on the subject led to a head-on
collision with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 1 The
28 Id. at 591-92, 279 A.2d at 677-78.
'9 State v. DeStasio, 49 N.J. 247, 260-61, 228 A.2d 636, 644, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830
(1967).
A fine example of the Chief Justice's willingness to shun constitutional approaches in
this area is State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). In that case the court allowed
access to a migrant worker camp for a field worker and an attorney who wished to see their
clients. The case was argued on a variety of constitutional grounds, including the first and
sixth amendments. The Chief Justice stated:
The policy considerations which underlie [our] conclusion may be much the same as
those which would be weighed with respect to one or more of the constitutional
challenges, but a decision in nonconstitutional terms is more satisfactory, because
the interests of migrant workers are more expansively served in that way than they
would be if they had no more freedom than these constitutional concepts could be
found to mandate if indeed they apply at all.
Id. at 302-03, 277 A.2d at 372. The value of the property rights asserted by the defendant
could not equal the value of the human rights at stake.
1o See, e.g., State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968).
1 Less than two weeks after the Third Circuit decided United States ix rel. Russo v.
New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965), which held that waiver at the interrogation stage
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Chief Justice chafed under rules allowing one federal judge, ten
years after a conviction, to
pit his experienced or sometimes inexperienced assessment
against the seasoned evaluations of a host of State judges, and...
thereby undo the State court judgment without so much as an
intimation of a shadow of a shadow of a doubt as to the truth of
the conviction.3 2
Chief Justice Weintraub incorporated these views into his
attack, in State v. Funicello, on the United States Supreme Court's
views on criminal justice. 33 Funicello concerned the validity of New
Jersey's first-degree murder statute, which allowed a defendant to
escape risk of the death penalty by pleading guilty. The New Jersey
Supreme Court heard a fifth amendment attack on the statute
based on United States v. Jackson."* Jackson declared invalid the
federal kidnapping statute imposing the death penalty following
conviction in a jury trial but not following conviction in a nonjury
trial. In July 1968, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided State v.
Forcella,3 5 which found the state statute valid. Forcella and his
co-petitioner, Funicello, sought a writ of certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court. The petition was held in abeyance for three
years until disposed of by memorandum in June 1971: "Judg-
ments, insofar as they impose the death sentence, reversed and...
remanded to the Supreme Court of New Jersey for further
proceedings.136
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
dutifully followed the cryptic opinion of the United States Supreme
Court, declared the death penalty provisions of its statute uncon-
stitutional, and resentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.3 7
requires that the police offer such waiver and that it be intelligently and understandably
refused, Chief Justice Weintraub issued a directive to the New Jersey courts to ignore the
Third Circuit holding. The New Jersey Supreme Court shortly decided a case in which it
gave stricter range to the concept of waiver. See State v. Ordog, 45 N.J. 347, 212 A.2d 370
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1022 (1966); cf. State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d 393
(1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966).
32 State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 72-73, 286 A.2d 55, 61-62, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942
(1972).
3 60 N.J. at 69-84, 286 A.2d at 59-68.
34 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
35 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968), rev'd, 403 U.S. 948 (1971).
36 403 U.S. 948 (1971). Chief Justice Weintraub, in his concurring opinion, also took
direct issue with the authorities cited by the federal court. Three cases cited in the
memorandum opinion-Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Boulden v. Holman,
394 U.S. 478 (1969); and Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970)-dealt with the
qualifications of jurors in capital cases, not with the option to avoid the death penalty by
pleading guilty. See 60 N.J. at 66-67, 286 A.2d at 58.
11 60 N.J. at 65-69, 286 A.2d at 57-59.
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But Chief Justice Weintraub could not understand the United
States Supreme Court's summary disposition of so important a
matter of state criminal justice. He took the occasion to fully
rebuke the Federal Court for its shoddy methods and strained
logic: "Judicial management is high among present priorities....
The case before us dramatizes the failure to provide direction and
suggests the Federal and State judiciaries cannot meet their
responsibilities unless some rules are changed. ' '3 8 Implicit in Chief
Justice Weintraub's attack was a concern over the shift in rule
making authority in criminal procedure from the state courts,
which still have the primary responsibility for law enforcement, to
the federal courts, which are far removed from the ultimate effects
of their rulings.
The issue in Funicello went beyond its particular constitutional
holding, however, to expose the weakness of the Federal Supreme
Court's attempts to handle criminal procedure on a case-by-case
basis:
Had the Supreme Court of New Jersey handed down an
opinion likeJackson, one of the assignment judges responsible for
judicial administration in the several vicinages of the State, would
have immediately telephoned the Chief Justice, as administrative
head of the judiciary, and asked quite bluntly for some guidance
as to what was expected. Specifically, the question would be
whether the State Supreme Court intended to declare the
homicide statute unconstitutional, and if so, whether the death
penalty or the non vult plea survived. That guidance would be
imperative, for the trial bench must know what to do with
murder indictments. But there is no established line of com-
munication between the State Supreme Court and the Federal
Supreme Court whereby such information, so obviously needed
for intelligent management of judicial business, can be had.
The one avenue of access to the Federal Supreme Court, petition
for certiorari, took three years and resulted in a summary
disposition. Yet, the Chief Justice observed, the implications of that
disposition could be enormous because most states have some
procedure to avoid the risk of death by a plea of guilty.4"
The Chief Justice made an assessment of the Federal Supreme
Court's labors and offered some suggestions:
The management problem is not all confined to capital
punishment. The judicial process in the entire area of criminal
law is a mess. A school boy, if he knew what we do, would stop
38 Id. at 69, 286 A.2d at 59-60.
39 Id. at 75, 286 A.2d at 63.
" Id. at 81, 286 A.2d at 66.
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and wonder. Chariges must be made if the judiciaries, State and
Federal, are to serve their common employer.
It would be well to reunite the power to lay down the rules
with the responsibility for the end result. Perhaps the concept of
two separate judicial systems is anachronistic. Perhaps the federal
courts should try all State crimes; surely the State courts would
still have more than enough to do. I appreciate that some of the
new constitutional precepts reflect a purpose to protect
minorities from discrimination. No one can quarrel with that
objective; a constitution can have no role more vital. Perhaps it
would have been better to have gone directly to that end by
removing to the federal court for trial any case in which the
possibility of such injustice might be feared.
In any event, there must be some effective channel of
communication if we are to overcome the problem generated by
the shift of constitutional authority to the Federal Supreme
Court. The case-by-case method of making law is intolerably
inefficient. We are not dealing with some sometime issue. The
criminal law teems with activity which every day touches the
safety of more than two hundred million people. The police, the
prosecutors, and the judges must know promptly what may and
may not be done. 41
If the state courts are to be denied the right to make the rules
in an area where they carry the burden of judicial responsibility,
state court judges must remain vigilant that the rules formulated
for then serve the needs of society and the needs of the state
judicial system. Chief Justice Weintraub saw the methods and
policies of the United States Supreme Court as detrimental to
society and his courts. Direct criticism represented the only course
remaining to correct these methods and policies.
II
SCHOOL FINANCING
An attack on New Jersey's local property tax system for
financing public education came to the New Jersey Supreme Court
at the height of a nationwide legal controversy. The 1971 decision
of the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest,42 held that
California's financing system violated the equal protection guaran-
tees of the fourteenth amendment. As the New Jersey Supreme
Court reviewed its own system, an attack on a similar system in
Texas was pending in the United States Supreme Court.43 The
1, Id. at 83, 286 A.2d at 67.
42 5 Cal. 3d. 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
43 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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plaintiffs in the New Jersey case, Robinson v. Cahill, 44 argued on the
basis of Serrano that a property-based tax system rested on the
invidious classification of wealth and denied equality in the
fundamental right of education. The plaintiffs further argued that
the system failed to fulfill the state constitution's demand of a
"thorough and efficient" education for all of the state's children.45
Chief Justice Weintraub's extensive opinion in Robinson, strik-
ing down the New Jersey system on state constitutional grounds,
stands as the leading case on this issue. The Serrano opinion, which
was based on federal equal protection theories, was substantially
undercut by the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.46 Robinson followed Rodriguez
by only two weeks and revived the school funding controversy
which had seemingly been dampened by the federal decision.
Robinson rests on the state constitutional clause that the legislature
must provide a "thorough and efficient" education to all children, a
clause which is common to many of the states which now face, or
will soon face, a similar challenge to their school financing system. 47
The trial court in Robinson had relied in large part on the
rationale of Serrano v. Priest in holding that New Jersey's system, as
it stood in 1972, violated tlhe equal protection guarantees of the
state and federal constitutions.48 Chief Justice Weintraub dealt with
this issue first.
Equal protection had become, in the last twenty years, an
ever-growing concept, with the courts struggling fitfully to contain
its expansiveness within workable theories. Originally, legislation
creating classifications would be upheld if a rational basis could be
found for the classification. 49 But the United States Supreme Court
seemingly qualified the rationality doctrine by calling for a stricter
justification-a "compelling state interest"-in two respects: (1) if
the classification was found to be "suspect,"5 and (2) if the legisla-
44 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), modifying 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (L.
Div. 1972).
45 Id. at 508, 303 A.2d at 291.
46 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
47 See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. XX, § 7; DEL. CONST. art. 10, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. VIII, §
1; PA. CONST. art. X, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
48 118 N.J. Super. at 270-80, 287 A.2d at 212-16.
,49 See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 94-99 (1966); Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969).
50 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); BoIling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tion touched on a "fundamental right. 5 1 Race represented the
prime "suspect' classification, and now some courts and commen-
tators urged wealth to be so considered. Voting, in the context of
the reapportionment cases, represented the first "fundamental
right," and some urged education as another. Serrano held the
nation's attention as a forceful exponent of both of these views.
But these broader equal protection standards adopted by the
California Supreme Court were rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Rodriguez. The several opinions in the Federal
Court's decision reviewed the conflicting equal protection theories
the Court had spawned, and the majority opinion attempted to
reorder these theories. Wealth had never been delcared a suspect
classification, Justice Powell stated for the majority, and education
cannot rank as a fundamental right. Under the Court's new
formulations, only those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in
the Federal Constitution ranked as fundamental. The stricter
"compelling state interest" justification would not be applied to
school financing legislation. The Court held that the reliance in the
Texas system on local governments to finance education was not
irrational and, therefore, the system was valid.52
Reviewing the New Jersey system of public education in light
of the Rodriguez pronouncement, Chief Justice Weintraub found
the New Jersey legislation to be rationally based and, therefore,
valid on federal equal protection grounds.53 But the Chief Justice
took the opportunity to express some thoughts about the duality of
federal equal protection standards. He viewed the "fundamental
right" concept established in Rodriguez as "immediately vulnerable,
for the right to acquire and hold property is guaranteed in the
Federal and State Constitutions, and surely that right is not a likely
candidate for such preferred treatment. ' 54 And he quarreled with
the Supreme Court's basic approach to constitutional questions-an
approach which relied on such undefined concepts as "fundamen-
tal rights" and "compelling state interests." The use of such terms
only obscured the issues and forestalled productive discussion.
Chief Justice Weintraub preferred a simpler, but more efficient,
approach:
Mechanical approaches to the delicate problem of judicial inter-
vention under either the equal protection or the due process
51 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
52 411 U.S. at 28-39.
53 62 N.J. at 488-89, 303 A.2d at 280-82.
54 Id. at 489, 303 A.2d at 282.
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clauses may only divert a court from the meritorious issue or
delay consideration of it. Ultimately, a court must weigh the
nature of the restraint or the denial against the apparent public
justification, and decide whether the State action is arbitrary. In
that process, if the circumstances sensibly so require, the court
may call upon the State to demonstrate the existence of a
sufficient public need for the restraint or the denial.55
A discrimination with an invidious base may be declared "sus-
pect," but the effect of such a finding would be only to shift the
burden of proof to the state. The test of "arbitrariness" would
remain the same, but "the inquiry may well end, for it is not likely
that a State interest could sustain such a discrimination. '56
For state constitutional purposes, therefore, Chief Justice
Weintraub and the New Jersey Supreme Court would not accept
the notions of wealth as a suspect classification or education as a
fundamental right. Wealth can be the basis for both the imposition
of a burden, i.e., taxes, or the enjoyment of a benefit; invidiousness
should be judged in context, not in stock generalization.57 School
attendance in New Jersey is not conditioned on fees or individual
net worth, nor are local governments limited in their expenditures.
Education does not differ from "sundry other essential services,"
the Chief Justice declared, in that "the sums made available for
education by local taxation have been influenced by the size of the
tax base available for all activities of local government and by the
judgment of local authorities as to how much shall be raised for all
local needs. 58
The plaintiffs argued that the court should declare fundamen-
tal those rights for which the state remains responsible pursuant to
the state constitution; the education clause demands that the state
legislature maintain public schools. But this approach also fell
under the Chief Justice's analysis. All "governmental" services are
state obligations because all local governments are agents of the
state. 59
Despite the failure of the equal protection argument, Chief
Justice Weintraub found that the state's school financing system
could not be upheld when measured against the state constitution's
demand that the legislature maintain "thorough and efficient"
schools. The Chief Justice held for the court:
55 Id. at 489-90, 303 A.2d at 282.
56 Id. at 491, 303 A.2d at 282.
57 Id. at 492-93, 303 A.2d at 283.
18 Id. at 493, 303 A.2d at 283.
59 Id. at 496-98, 303 A.2d at 285-86.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The trial court found the constitutional demand had not
been met and did so on the basis of discrepancies in dollar input
per pupil. We agree. We deal with the problem in those terms
because dollar input is plainly relevant and because we have been
shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with
the constitutional mandate. The constitutional mandate could
not be said to be satisfied unless we were to suppose the unlikely
proposition that the lowest level of dollar performance happens
to coincide with the constitutional mandate and that all efforts
beyond the lowest level are attributable to local decisions to do
more than the State was obliged to do.
Surely the existing statutory system is not visibly geared to
the mandate that there be "a thorough and efficient system of
free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this
state between the ages of five and eighteen years." Indeed the
State has never spelled out the content of the educational oppor-
tunity the Constitution requires. Without some such prescription,
it is even more difficult to understand how the tax burden can be
left to local initiative with any hope that statewide equality of
educational opportunity will emerge.6 0
This holding rests firmly in the history of public education in New
Jersey. From a thorough study of early reports of the State School
Board, the Chief Justice learned the basis and background of the
education clause which had been added to the New Jersey Con-
stitution in 1875. In 1871, when free schools were established, the
state legislature sought to meet all operating expenses through the
statewide property tax. Local taxation was not discouraged for
school districts "with more than ordinary enterprise" which desired
more than a "thorough and efficient" education for their
children. 6 1 In fact, local taxation was essential to provide
schoolhouses. But the minimum education had to be provided for
all. 2 As an 1895 case stated, the purpose of the education clause
amendment was to afford "to every child such instruction as is
necessary to fit it for the ordinary duties of citizenship. ' 63 Chief
Justice Weintraub brought the minimum standard up to date:
"The Constitution's guarantee must be understood to embrace that
educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary
setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor
in the labor market. '64
Equality of dollar input per pupil was rejected as a naive and
"u Id. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295.
61 See NEW JERSEY SCHOOL REPORT FOR 1868, at 22-24, cited in Robinson v. Cahill, 62
N.J. 473, 508, 303 A.2d 273, 290 (1973).
62 Much of the information relied on was found in the New Jersey School Reports for
the years 1871-90. See 62 N.J. at 508, 303 A.2d at 290.
63 Landis v. Ashworth, 57 N.J.L. 509, 512, 31 A. 1017, 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
64 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
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counterproductive approach to the complex educational problems
faced by urban, suburban, and rural schools; equality in educa-
tional result was rejected as an impossible approach which failed to
recognize individual and group differences. The goal is educa-
tional opportunity. The state must see that a minimum level of
educational opportunity is afforded to all children.65 The Chief
Justice did not see reliance on' local governments as inherently
invalid in providing this required level of opportunity. But he
reminded the legislature of its duties if it seeks to use such methods
and coupled that reminder with a warning:
We repeat that if the State chooses to assign its obligation
under the 1875 amendment to local government, the State must
do so by a plan which will fulfill the State's continuing obligation.
To that end the State must define in some discernible way the
educational obligation and must compel the local school districts to
raise the money necessary to provide that opportunity. The State
has never spelled out the content of the constitutionally man-
dated educational opportunity. Nor has the State required the
school districts to raise moneys needed to achieve that unstated
standard. Nor is the State aid program designed to compensate
for local failures to reach that level. It must be evident that our
present scheme is a patchy product reflecting provincial contests
rather than a plan sensitive only to the constitutional mandate. 6
As to remedies, the court scheduled further argu-
ment.6 7 The trial court had ordered that certain state moneys
appropriated for school aid be distributed according to its order
rather than according to the state statutes. 68 But the New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized that the educational system of the state
could not remain in flux while the court struggled to develop an
equitable program of state school aid; the legislature is the proper
body to formulate complex plans of state appropriation. The
legislature was given until January 1, 1975, to devise and imple-
ment a plan for state financing of public education compatible with
the principles of the state constitution. Absent such legislative
action, however, the court has retained jurisdiction to act alone. 69
III
REAPPORTIONMENT
The New Jersey Supreme Court entered the reapportionment
thicket in 1960 when, in Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 70 it
6 Id.
66 Id. at 519-20, 303 A.2d at 297.
67 Id. at 520-21, 303 A.2d at 298.
68 118 N.J. Super. at 280-81, 287 A.2d at 217.
69 Robinson'v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 198, 306 A.2d 65, 66 (1972).
70 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
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questioned the validity of the apportionment of the General As-
sembly under the state constitution. The 1947 New Jersey Con-
stitution had provided for a bicameral legislature: a Senate to
consist of one senator from each county, and a General Assembly
of sixty members apportioned essentially by population.7 1 In 1960,
the General Assembly was apportioned on the basis of the 1940
census, 72 despite significant population shifts since that census was
taken.
In Woolley, several citizens sought a declaration from the court
that the continued 1941 apportionment violated the state
constitution's demand for reapportionment after each federal cen-
sus. The court, through Justice Francis, discarded the argument
that the issue was not justiciable and proceeded to outline both the
impropriety of the 1941 apportionment and the remedies available
to correct the injustices. The court then withheld decision to give
the legislature the opportunity to correct the faults.
With Chief Justice Weintraub as its spokesman, the New Jersey
Supreme Court was called upon to face the difficult question of the
validity of the New Jersey legislative structure under the equal
protection standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Reynolds v. Sims .7' The string of New Jersey apportionment cases
from 1964 to the present serves as an example to other state and
federal courts of the Weintraub Court's ability to work with its
coordinate branches of government to achieve practical solutions in
a sensitive area of law and politics. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has had to supervise the restructuring of the state legislature amid
an intense rural-urban clash and a strong two-party system. 4
Despite its activity, however, the court has not found it necessary to
take the task of reapportionment upon itself. Sensitive to political
implications and legislative prerogatives, the court has been able to
perform its constitutional duties through the use of deadlines and
threatened sanctions.
A. The Interim Plan
Following the United States Supreme Court's action in Reynolds
v. Sims and related cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court an-
7' N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2, para. 1; id. art. IV, § 3, para. 1; id. art. IV, §§ 2-3 (1844).
This structure was originally established in New Jersey's 1766 Constitution which provided
for a Legislative Council of one member from each county and a General Assembly of three
members from each county. N.J. CONST. art. III (1766).
2 See New Jersey Laws, ch. 310, § 1 (1941).
73 377 U.S. 533 (1"964).
74 See A. SHANK, NEw JERSEY REAPPORTIONMENT POLrIcs: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS IN
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1969).
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nounced its decision in Jackman v. Bodine.7 5 Chief Justice Wein-
traub, writing the majority opinion as he did in all the decisions in
this area, outlined the issues before his court: "One is whether the
legislative article of our State Constitution is invalid in the respects
alleged by plaintiffs. The other, if such invalidity is found, is what
must be done to meet the federal demand. 7 6
The Chief Justice noted initially that the legislative provisions
of the New Jersey Constitution "on their face, do not meet the
quoted test of Reynolds v. Sims" that both houses of a bicameral
legislature be apportioned substantially on a population basis.77
Accordingly, the Chief Justice moved to provide judicial relief. The
court once again showed its practicality and its willingness to prod
the legislature into proper action:
We need not explore the abstract question whether a legisla-
ture, thus constituted in violation of the equal protection clause,
can exercise the legislative power. The answer is provided ab-
ruptly by sheer necessity. The familiar doctrine which prevents
collateral attack upon past acts of "de facto" officials rests upon an
underlying need for governmental order. That need is even
more imperative when the spectre proposed is a government
without legislative power. The answer must be that the legislators
continue in office with the powers of their branch of govern-
ment, subject however to the duty of the State to bring the
legislative branch into harmony with the Federal Constitution
with diligence.
The duty to comply with the equal protection clause rests
upon the three branches of State Government and upon the
people of the State as well. The question is what part must be
played by each.78
"[T]he judiciary should not itself devise a plan except as a last
resort," the Chief Justice continued, due to the political implica-
tions inherent in reapportionment and because such a plan "will
likely seem so attractive to some as to impede the search for
common agreement."7 9 But the court refused to sanction further
elections under the existing scheme of apportionment.8 " The legis-
lature was directed to devise an interim plan for the next general
election in 1965 and a permanent plan for the 1967 elections.
The state later moved to forego an interim plan for the 1965
elections in expectation that the Constitutional Convention then
75 43 N.J. 453, 205 A.2d 713 (1964).
76 Id. at 457, 205 A.2d at 715.
77 Id. at 459-60, 205 A.2d at 716.




being planned would soon devise a permanent plan in time for the
1967 elections. The court rejected this move to prolong the malap-
portioned legislature, but did approve a move to maintain the
existing General Assembly for the purposes of the 1965 interim
plan.81 Shortly thereafter, the legislature submitted its plan for the
1965 Senate elections; the court reviewed and approved the plan
for that one election year. The new Senate maintained the integrity
of all of the counties through the creation of multi-county districts;
membership totaled 29 and the average weighted deviation for all
14 districts was 9.4 percent.82
A Constitutional Convention was convened in the spring of
1966 and that fall the voters of New Jersey adopted substantial
revisions to their state constitution. The new legislative structure, to
serve for the 1967 and subsequent elections, created a Senate
resembling the interim Senate: multi-county districts and multi-
member single county districts were to be used to fulfill the
requirement that "[e]ach Senate district shall be composed, wher-
ever practicable, of one single county, and, if not so practicable, of
two or more contiguous whole counties.118 3 The Senate would be a
40-member body and the Assembly. an 80-member body, appor-
tioned within Senate districts, two assemblymen to each senator.84
Another constitutional provision adopted in 1966 created a biparti-
san Apportionment Commission to handle apportionment after
each census.
8 5
B. The Invalidity of the New Constitutional Provisions
The newly-created Apportionment Commission followed the
dictates of the 1966 constitutional provisions and submitted a plan
creating 15 Senate districts to be used until the 1970 census figures
became available. The population deviations in the Senate districts
ranged + 13.5 percent to -13.8 percent from the standard district.
A challenge to this plan came to the New Jersey Supreme Court
prior to the 1967 elections.
The court felt compelled to reduce the largest deviations in
this plan by rearranging the contiguous counties in the three
Jackman v. Bodine, 44 N.J. 312, 317, 208 A.2d 648, 650 (1965).
82 Jackman v. Bodine, 44 N.J. 414, 209 A.2d 825 (1965). The court stated: "[W]e are
mindful that we are dealing with a plan for the temporary reapportionment of the
Legislature rather than its permanent structure. We appreciate also the practical problems
involved in making a transition from the historical representative pattern . Id. at 417,
209 A.2d at 826.
83 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2, para. 1.
84 Id. art. IV, § 2, para. 3.
85 Id. art. IV, § 3, para. 1.
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districts in which such deviations occurred and, contrary to the
state constitution, dividing Gloucester County. The Senate devia-
tions were thereby reduced substantially while at the same time
improving the apportionment of assemblymen to these districts.
The court stated:
[D]eviations from absolute equality may be tolerated to the
end that existing political boundaries will be respected and ger-
rymandering thus discouraged, provided of course that the de-
viations be not unreasonable. But where, as here, the same
objective can readily be achieved by another arrangement of the
same contiguous counties, resulting in a substantially reduced
deviation, that arrangement must be accepted.86
At the same time, the court struck down the constitutional re-
quirement that assemblymen be allocated to each district by doubl-
ing the number of senators from that district. Such a method
would "accentuate any disparity which exists in the Senate" and
would create an "artificial inequality in the General Assembly"
which offends the federal constitutional mandate for mathematical
equality. s7 Assemblymen were to be apportioned without reference
to the apportionment of senators even if that resulted in an odd
number of assemblymen in any one district. The court ordered the
Apportionment Commission to undertake this task for the 1969
elections and, for the upcoming 1967 elections, the court by its own
order shifted several Assembly seats from one Senate district to
another.88
When the court reviewed the 1969 Assembly districts prepared
by the Apportionment Commission, it reiterated that Reynolds v.
Sims allowed deviations from population equality to preserve po-
litical subdivisions for the purpose of avoiding gerrymandering 89
Jackman v. Bodine, 49 N.J. 406, 415, 231 A.2d 193, 198 (1967).
87 Id. at 416-17, 231 A.2d at 199.
88 Id. at 416-18, 231 A.2d at 199-200; seeJackman v. Bodine, 50 N.J. 127, 232 A.2d 419
(1967).
'9 In Jones v. Falcey, 48 N.J. 25, 222 A.2d 101 (1966), an attack on New Jersey's 1966
congressional redistricting act, the Chief Justice spoke to the way a court should approach
gerrymandering:
The trial court described such issues as non-justiciable. Perhaps it would be
more accurate to say such issues are beyond judicial condemnation, not because the
controversy is beyond the jurisdictional authority of the Court, but rather because
the Constitution does not prescribe a single approach or motivation for the drawing
of district lines, and hence the Constitution is not offended merely because a
partisan advantage is in view. Indeed, it would be difficult to separate partisan
interests from other interests, since partisan interests may well be but a summation
of such other interests. In addition, it would seem impossible for a court to pass
upon the validity of political interests without itself making a political judgment or
appearing to do so. For these reasons the view generally taken in this new area of
judicial activity is that, if the mathematics are acceptable, it rests with the voters,
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and maintaining governmental relations with the state. But the
court went further, indicating grave doubts about "whether the
basic plan of apportionment in our State Constitution is compatible
with Federal Constitutional requirements as to either the Senate or
Assembly," due to the adherence to boundaries based on whole
counties.90 The court did not resolve this issue, pending the redis-
tricting to follow the 1970 census figures, but it did order further
argument prior to the 1971 elections.
New Jersey's 1966 constitutional revisions now also stood in
jeopardy of the federal equal protection demands. In this context,
Chief Justice Weintraub used later opinions to place the rationale
of Reynolds v. Sims in perspective as to the importance given to
mathematical equality among districts:
One-man one-vote reflects an ideal that every man's vote
should equal another's. The ideal is unattainable because that
equality could be had only in an election at large-here
statewide-and an election at large would be undesirable because
it would deny other democratic values. This is so because in such
a contest the winner may take all, and this would foreclose the
value of check and dissent. Further, important interests might
have no spokesmen. Then, too, voting would be blind, since
voters could not know enough about so many candidates. For
those reasons it is better, and compatible with the equal protec-
tion clause, to apportion the power to elect among clusters of
citizens. Those clusters however are constituted solely on the
basis of geography, and when that is done, a man's vote is no
longer assured equality at large. The value of the vote of a
member of a statewide majority may then be nullified if he is of
the minority in the geographic district in which he must vote, or
his vote may be enhanced or diminished in relation to a vote in
another district depending upon the percentages of voter eligibil-
ity, voter registration, and voter indifference on election day in
the respective districts. 91
The Chief Justice therefore viewed the issue as "whether it is not
tolerable to accept some further, and perhaps countervailing, im-
balance in the drawing of district lines if to do so will tend to
rather than the Court, to review the soundness of the partisan decisions which may
inhere in the lines the Legislature drew. Actual experience of course may generate
exceptions to that approach.
Id. at 32-33, 222 A.2d at 105. One such exception, the Chief Justice noted, would be lines
drawn on the basis of race, religion, or ancestry, but he felt that the claims the plaintiffs
made that the voting power of blacks in the city of Newark was being substantially diluted by
the congressional redistricting act were not provable. Id. at 34-35, 222 A.2d at 106.
9o Jackman v. Bodine, 53 N.J. 585, 588, 252 A.2d 209, 210, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822
(1969).
9' Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 60 N.J. 483, 489-90, 291 A.2d 134, 138 (1972).
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advance the purpose of districting."92 And in this context the 1.5 to
1 ratio between the most and least populous districts authorized by
the New Jersey Constitution was deemed not "inherently bad,"
although recent United States Supreme Court decisions93 require
that such deviations be justified by the state and "the best plan is
the one with the least population deviation. 94
The 1970 census further confused the New Jersey apportion-
ment picture. The plan devised by the Apportionment Commission
could not fulfill the mathematical demands of the federal cases.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state constitutional
dictate that counties remain inviolate for Senate districts would be
suspended in light of the new figures. Only 10 single county
districts remained in the 1970 plan of 15 districts; the other 11
counties were bunched into 5 districts. The justification for main-
taining whole counties---"the public advantage gained by assuring
each county a separate voice in its relations with the
State" 95-would not be achieved even in the present formulation
and, therefore, the deviation of 28.83 percent could not be main-
tained. Eleven counties would not have an independent voice in the
Senate; single county districts with multiple representation would
92 Jackman v. Bodine, 55 N.J. 371, 378, 262 A.2d 389, 393, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849
(1970).
"3 See, e.g., Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
94 55 N.J. at 382-83, 262 A.2d at 395. In this opinion, however, the Chief Justice
questioned the efficacy of the multi-member districts, the mainstay of the New Jersey system,
particularly as to their effects on minorities:
We assume a legislature may not be apportioned on racial, religious, national,
ethnic, or economic lines, i.e., by allotting a pro rata number of representatives to
each identifiable group to be elected exclusively by the voters of that group no
matter where they reside. Apart from the impossibility of recognizing all such
conceivable interests, an apportionment upon that basis would run against the
central concept of Reynolds v. Sims that the apportionment of population shall be
made only in terms of geography, with no notice whatever of constituencies beyond
their numerical count. Of course in practical politics minority interests nonetheless
have a voice, for obviously in the selection of a slate a political party cannot be
indifferent to a minority, at least if its members are sufficiently numerous. But the
question is whether the equal protection clause requires single-member districts to
insure the maximum chance of election by minorities, and so requires even though
such districting may benefit only a minority which is concentrated geographically
and even though the value of the votes of others within the district who are not
members of that minority may thereby be effectively nullified.
Id. at 385, 262 A.2d at 396-97. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not need to decide the
issue of multi-member districts at this time and the issue went unresolved. But the Chief
Justice placed the issue in the proper contours for the United States Supreme Court which
might someday have to face the question. In its next reapportionment decision the New
Jersey Supreme Court had to suspend the multi-member districting requirements of the
state constitution as insufficient to fulfill the mathematical demands of equal protection. See
Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 60 N.J. 483, 291 A.2d 134 (1972).
" Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 60 N.J. 483, 495, 291 A.2d 134, 141 (1972).
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have a larger influence in the Senate than they should be afforded.
Counties could no longer constitute the building blocks of appor-
tionment and must be replaced by municipalities. 96
The New Jersey legislative reapportionment story does not
gain significance from the details of the plans submitted or the
court's comments upon them. Its import lies in the workings of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in the complex task of implementing
difficult standards upon the state's political structure. The court
took a practical approach which produced results and avoided
collisions with the legislature and the governor. Realizing the limits
of the judiciary in this delicate area, it coaxed the more appropriate
organs of government into the proper action.
CONCLUSION
The New Jersey Supreme Court, under the leadership of
Joseph Weintraub, served the state and the nation well. Through
practicality, common sense, and sound legal scholarship, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has led the nation's courts in judicial ad-
ministration and decision making. Praise and recognition for the
work of the New Jersey Supreme Court in this period represents
praise and recognition for Joseph Weintraub, for he constituted
the motivating force and the guiding light which sparked the court
to excellence.
96 Id. at 495-98, 291 A.2d at 141-43.
Since the court decided Scrimminger, the United States Supreme Court has issued several
opinions suggesting wider latitude in state legislative apportionment matters. See White v.
Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U.S. 735 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). In his last reapportionment
opinion, Chief Justice Weintraub held that New Jersey's constitutional legislative structure
could not be salvaged by these decisions because of the breadth of its required mathematical
deviations. But the Chief Justice did suggest that the argument that as many Senate districts
as possible be placed within whole counties might be constitutionally supported. A date was
set for further argument on the matter and consideration of districting plans so drawn. See
Davenport v. Apportionment Comm'n, - N.J. -, 308 A.2d 3 (1973).
